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VENUE SHOPPING
The Judges of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
The United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is one of a small number of special judicial
bodies. The MDL Panel is a powerful judicial institution; for all practical purposes, it controls where many
of the most far-reaching private civil actions will be resolved. The significance of the MDL Paners work
underscores the value of knowing more about the judges who exercise such substantial authority
by TRACEY E. GEORGE and MARGARET S. WILLIAMS
A cosmetic company offers a mois-
turizer to fight the signs of aging; a
pharmaceutical lab creates a generic
version of a steroid; and a large social-
networking website makes its initial
public offering. While seemingly
unrelated, these three events are all
part of the world of complex litiga-
tion in federal courts. Each eventu-
ally produces thousands of separate
lawsuits in multiple federal districts.
The civil actions arising from each
commercial activity share many of
the same facts, parties, and issues.
The simultaneous independent liti-
gation of these related actions would
not only be inefficient but also poses
the risk of inconsistent decisions as
different judges rule on the same
legal questions. This is where the
United States Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation (MDL Panel)
enters the picture.
The MDL Panel may transfer factu-
ally related actions filed in different
federal districts to a single judge in
any federal district for consolidated
pretrial litigation.' The chief justice
selects the seven members of the
MDL Panel, also known as the JPML,
from the district and circuit courts.
These seven judges have substantial
discretion in deciding whether to
consolidate, where to transfer con-
solidated suits, and who will manage
the consolidated multidistrict action
(or MDL).2 While a transferred case
theoretically returns to the trans-
feror judge for trial, nearly all cases
are resolved in the transferee court.3
Yet, the MDL Panel is not well known
outside the circle of attorneys and
parties who appear before it.
The relative obscurity of the MDL
process belies its importance. If a
manufacturer produces a harmful
product, an airplane crashes, or
a public corporation loses a large
amount of money, then multidis-
trict litigation is a natural conse-
quence. The Panel's docket reads like
a laundry list of the most important
lawsuits of the last half-century,
including securities and deriva-
tive lawsuits related to the collapse
of financial services firm Lehman
Brothers and to the Ponzi scheme of
Bernie Madoff; consumer protection
claims involving thousands of plain-
tiffs and millions of dollars; products
liability actions, including more than
40,000 asbestos cases and thou-
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
2. Margaret S. Williams & Tracey E. George,
Who Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation? The
Decision to Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict
Litigation, 10 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 424 (2013).
3. See Emery G. Lee, Margaret S. Williams,
Richard A. Nagareda, Joe S. Cecil, Thomas E.
Willging & Kevin M. Scott, The Expanding Role of
Multidistrict Consolidation in Federal Civil Litiga-
tion: An Empirical Investigation, Working Paper
(2012) (detailing how, when, and where MDL
cases are resolved).
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sands of silicone gel breast implant
suits; common disasters like the BP
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the
Union Carbide chemical plant disas-
ter in Bhopal, India; and nearly every
air crash claim filed in federal court.
These MDLs illustrate the scope and
scale of multidistrict litigation in
federal courts.
The raw number of cases, claims,
parties, and dollars alone would
make the MDL Panel a significant
subject of study, but the impact of
those cases reaches even farther.
Because the lawsuits are among
the most high-profile federal civil
actions, their disposition influences
the public's perception of the civil
justice system and impacts the devel-
opment of public policy in the related
substantive and procedural areas of
law. The handling and resolution of
these disputes affect large numbers
of individuals and alter the behav-
ior of corporations, federal agencies,
state governments, and law firms.
The significance of the MDL
Panel's work underscores the value
of knowing more about the judges
who exercise such substantial
authority. The Panel's composition
also may help us to better under-
stand its decisions. In light of the
importance of the MDL Panel and
its rulings, the current article looks
4. Philip C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Elec-
trical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel judicial
Administration, 50 A.B.A. JOURNAL 621 (1964).
5. 28 U.S.C. §1407(d).
6. See John G. Heyburn, A View From the Panel:
Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REv. 2225, 2227
(2008).
7. See, e.g., Rodney Mott, Spencer Albright
& Helen R. Semmerling, Judicial Personnel, 167
ANNALS 143 (1933).
8. The most recent of these articles appeared
in 2011. Sheldon Goldman, Sara Schiavoni &
Elliott Slotnick, Obama'sJudiciary at Midterm, 94
JUDICATURE 262 (2011).
9. See, e.g., Susan Carbon, Pauline Houlden
& Larry Berkson, Women on the State Bench:
Their Characteristics and Attitudes aboutJudicial
Selection, 65 JUDICATURE 294 (1982); Margaret
S. Williams, In a Different Path: The Process of
Becoming a Judge for Women and Men, 90 JUDICA-
TURE 104 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein &
Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects
ofSex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. Sci. 5389 (2010).
11. Stephanie Francis Ward, Women Should be
Among Lead Lawyers in IUD Case, Federal judge




at the Panel's membership since its
creation, identifying significant pat-
terns in the judges' backgrounds and
experiences.
The Creation of the U.S. Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
In the early 1960s, 1,880 civil anti-
trust lawsuits were filed against a
group of electrical equipment manu-
facturers in 35 judicial districts from
coast to coast.' The suits involved
more than 25,000 claims seeking
treble damages from defendants,
who had previously pled guilty or
been convicted of criminal anti-trust
violations. These "electrical equip-
ment" lawsuits, as they became
known, threatened to overwhelm
the federal trial courts. The sheer
number of suits was staggering, but
the cases shared in common a set of
complex substantive and procedural
issues.
The Judicial Conference of the
United States created a new subcom-
mittee in 1962-the Coordinating
Committee for Multiple Litigation of
the United States District Courts-
to manage the pretrial stages of the
electrical equipment litigation. The
Committee established a central-
ized national pretrial process with
the voluntary participation of all
parties and judges. Despite some
initial skepticism, the coordinated
pretrial litigation was considered a
great success. In 1965, Chief Justice
Earl Warren and the Conference pro-
posed the permanent establishment
of a judicial panel with the power
to transfer civil actions involving
common questions of fact to a single
district for consolidated pretrial pro-
ceedings. Three years later, Congress
created the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation.
The MDL statute provides that
"[t]he judicial panel on multidis-
trict litigation shall consist of seven
circuit and district judges designated
from time to time by the chief justice
of the United States, no two of whom
shall be from the same circuit."'
Beyond that, the statute leaves much
of its implementation to the Panel
itself as well as to the chief justice.
Panel tenure, for example, is not
set by statute; Chief Justice Warren
suggested that no appointee should
serve for more than three years. But
the first seven members stayed on for
an average of 10 years. Chief Justice
William Rehnquist in 2000 adopted
a practice of appointing panelists
for staggered seven-year terms, and
Chief Justice John W. Roberts Jr. has
continued that practice.6 The statute
did provide for the selection of a
Panel chair, who is also appointed by
the chief justice. The statute allows a
great deal of latitude in the choice of
judges who may serve on the Panel.
The next section provides some
context for why scholars study the
attributes and background of judges.
The Personal Attributes and Social
Background of Judges
Court research dating back to at
least the 1930s has focused on the
individuals sitting on the bench.' In
1978, Sheldon Goldman (later joined
by Elliot Slotnick and others) began
a series of federal judicial selection
articles injudicature profiling judges
appointed during the prior two years,
comparing the gender, race, occupa-
tion, education, and party of judges
selected by the sitting president to
those appointed by past presidents.'
State-court scholars have conducted
similar studies on state judges.9
Judicial background is not merely
descriptively interesting but it is
also substantively important to the
extent that a judge's attributes and
experiences may affect her or his
decisions. Numerous studies have
found individual characteristics,
to varying degrees and in different
contexts, influence judicial deci-
sions.o The fact that background
may affect decision making is not
lost on judges in the MDL process. In
the Mirena IUD multidistrict litiga-
tion, for example, transferee Judge
Cathy Seibel advised the all-male
group of lawyers seeking to serve as
lead plaintiffs' counsel to include a
woman in their group in light of the
nature of the litigation."
The small-group dynamics of the
Panel would seem an ample opportu-
nity for background characteristics
to influence the group's decision. In
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fact, Congress created the Panel in
order to capitalize on the fact that
judges with experience in complex
litigation would be better able to
assess whether related civil suits
should be consolidated for pre-
trial litigation. But complex litiga-
tion experience surely is not shared
evenly across the federal judiciary.
First, there was no precedent for
such experience prior to the 1960s,
at least not as a judge. Moreover, the
judges who gained this experience
came to the judiciary with a diverse
set of background characteristics.
By looking at the Panel over time, we
can examine how important expe-
rience is relatively, and if there is a
pattern in which judges gained expe-
rience with complex litigation.
The chief justice's authority
to select MDL Panel judges adds
another layer to the current study.
The chief justice appoints Article III
judges to serve in various capacities
beyond their principal role, includ-
ing service on judicial bodies. His
largest number of appointments is
to the committees of the U.S. Judicial
Conference." Judicial Conference
Committees and Subcommittees
advise the Conference, act on behalf
of the Conference and recommend
changes to rules of procedure and
practice such as the Rules of Evi-
dence and the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure." The JPML's predecessor was
a Conference Subcommittee, for
example. The Committees' actions,
like those of the MDL Panel, shape
the nature of litigation in federal
courts. The chief justice's unilat-
eral power to appoint judges to both
bodies creates an opportunity to
influence that litigation.
The Characteristics
of the MDL Panel Members
Who has served on the MDL Panel?
The characteristics of the panelists
obviously tell us a great deal about
the court as a descriptive matter
but also have implications for its
operation and public perception. We
examine the attributes and social
background, judicial experience,
and appointing president and chief
justice for the 46 MDL Panel judges
who have served from the Panel's
creation in 1968 through the end of
2012.
In order to put the MDL Panel's
composition in context, we need to
compare it to a relevant benchmark.
Our first benchmark is the popula-
tion of 2,417 judges who have served
on Article III courts from 1968 to
2012.14 Almost all of these judges
were eligible for appointment to the
MDL Panel. But we recognize that
not all of these judges were equally
willing or able to take on additional
responsibilities outside their home
courts. For a second benchmark, we
looked at another, much larger pro-
cedural body appointed by the chief
justice: the Judicial Conference Com-
mittees. The last three chief justices
have appointed a total of 861 judges
to at least one Judicial Conference
Committee.5 A judge may, but is not
required to, serve on both a Confer-
ence Committee and a special body
like the JPML. From 1971 through
2012, more than half of the MDL
Panel had also served on a Confer-
ence Committee (27, or 59%).16
A more detailed look at MDL Panel
judges may tease out what charac-
12. Dawn M. Chutkow, Policy Control, Political
Entrepreneurs, and the Courts: Judicial Confer-
ence Committee Appointments, Working Paper
(2012); Russell Wheeler, John Roberts Appoints
judges to More Than the FISA Court, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.brook-
ings.edu/research/articles/2013/08/08-john-
roberts-judges-appointees-wheeler; RUSSELL
WHEELER & GORDON BERMANT, FEDERAL COURT
GOVERNANCE 10-19 (1994).
13. United States Courts, Judicial Conference
of the United States: Committees, http://www.
uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConfer-
ence/Committees.aspx.
14. In addition to the 94 district courts,
13 appellate courts, the Supreme Court, the
Customs Court, the Court of International
Trade, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
and the Court of Claims are all included in
this analysis. Of the 2,371 judges who served
on one of those courts during this period, 218
served on two courts and 16 judges served on
three Article III courts. Several judges served
on multiple courts at the same time, including
those appointed to the Eastern and Western
districts of Missouri and the Western, Eastern,
and Northern Districts of Oklahoma. Other
judges served on multiple courts consecutively.
judges appointed to multiple courts simultane-
ously are assigned to a single court for pur-
poses of calculating the descriptive statistics
about the MDL Panel and the Conference Com-
mittees. All information was obtained from the
Federal Judicial Center Federal Judicial History
Database.
15. Our committee membership data is based
teristics are more likely to be held
by Panel members than by the rest of
the judiciary. Table 1 lists the judges
who have served on the Panel, the
judges' tenure on the Panel, and who
served as the Panel chair during that
tenure.17
Our MDL Panel database includes
detailed information about all Article
III judges serving from 1968 through
2012, including their biographical
data, tenure on the bench, service
on Judicial Conference Committees
and the MDL Panel, and experience
with MDL cases. The database relies
on various sources including the
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) Federal
Judicial History Office Biographical
Database, reports of the Adminis-
trative Office of the U.S. Courts, the
webpage of the MDL Panel, and MDL
Panel opinions and orders."'
Appointing Chieffustice
Chief justices control selection to
Judicial Conference Committees as
well as to special judicial bodies like
the MDL Panel. Variation in the com-
position, therefore, may may be due
to a chief justice's preferences. Only
four men, all Republican presiden-
on appointments since 1971, the first year when
data are available. Some of these 861 judges
served on more than one committee, and others
served only as chair of a committee and not as a
member. For a basic explanation of the judicial
Conference Committees, see ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE FEDERAL COURT
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUC-
TION FOR JUDGES AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATORS
IN OTHER COUNTRIES 38-39 (Washington, D.C.:
Article III Judges Division, Office of judges Pro-
grams, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
2000). The data were provided by the Adminis-
trative Office of the U.S. Courts. We thank Ellen
Gerdes for her assistance.
16. Terms of service on the MDL Panel and
the Conference Committees vary in length, and
neither is capped by law but instead is within
the discretion of the appointing chief justice.
Panelists were initially appointed without fixed
terms, but now the chief justice asks them to
serve for seven years. Likewise the Conference
Committee appointments vary in both expected
duration (with some appointments listed as
"Open Term") and in actual duration (with some
judges stepping down before the expiration of
their appointments). Because there is no clear
term limit for either set of appointments, we do
not control for term length.
17. Table 1 is recreated from Williams &
George, supra note 2.
18. While there is information about educa-
tion and some limited information about pro-
fessional background (e.g. "private practice"),
detail on these characteristics is insufficient
for analysis.
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Members of the U.S. judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (Appointed by U.S. Supreme Court Chief
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tial appointees, have served as chief
justice since the creation of the MDL
Panel: Chief Justices Warren, Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts. Judicial Con-
ference Committee data is available
for only the last three chief justices.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's appoint-
ments dominate our data, which is
not surprising since he served as
chief for nearly half of the period.
Chief Justice Warren appointed
the original seven MDL panelists
(15%), Burger appointed 11 (24%),
Rehnquist 18 (39%), and Roberts
10 (22%). The data for the Judicial
Conference Committee appoint-
ments begins in 1971 with Chief
Justice Burger.1 Burger appointed 74
of the Conference members (8.6%),
Rehnquist appointed 652 (75.7%),
and Roberts appointed 135 (15.7%).
Circuit Variation
The chief justice may appoint any
district or appellate judge to serve
on the Panel but is limited to one
from each circuit at any time. This
requirement has resulted in a more
even distribution of Panel members
across the circuits than we might
otherwise see. Figure 1 shows the
percentage of MDL Panel judges from
each circuit compared to the per-
centage of Judicial Conference Com-
mittee members and the percentage
of all Article III judges.2 0 The Second
Circuit has had the largest number of
judges (seven) on the MDL Panel. The
Sixth and Eleventh have had only two
judges on the MDL Panel, and the D.C.
Circuit has had none.
Another way to view circuit rep-
resentation is by looking at the MDL
Panel over time. The Ninth Circuit
has had a judge on the panel for 99
percent of the Panel's life. Excluding
those periods when a Panel seat is
empty, the MDL Panel lacked a Ninth
Circuit representative for only one
183-day period between the service
of Judge Enright and Judge Jensen.
Looking at the table, it is clear that
appointment is not randomly distrib-
uted across the circuits with some,
like the Third and Fifth, represented
for most of the Panel's existence
19. Judicial Conference Committee service
dates are listed by year, but changes in chief
justice can occur throughout the year. For
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist started his
tenure in September 1986 and died in Sep-
tember 2005. The Administrative Office does
not record the name of the chief justice who
appointed committee members, thus we had to
decide how to treat members appointed in a year
with two different chiefs. We opted to assign
based on which chief was in office the majority
of the year, and thus we assigned 1,986 appoint-
ments to Chief Justice Burger and 2005 appoint-
ments to Chief Justice Rehnquist.



























while others, like the Sixth or D.C.
Circuits, participating only briefly, if
at all. Given the importance of circuit
representation to case transfers, the
variation in representation is note-
worthy.21 That is, the Panel is more
likely to transfer a case to a court
represented on the Panel.
The seven Panel chairs have come
from seven different circuits. No
Panel chair has been a judge in the
Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, or D.C.
Circuits. The lack of a Third or Ninth
Circuit Panel chair is most surprising
given the considerable role both have
played in the MDL Panel's history.
Moreover, each circuit has had a
large number of MDL cases.
Judicial Experience
Judicial experience includes the
court on which a judge serves, length
20. At the time Judge Pointer was appointed
to the Panel, the Northern District of Alabama
was in the Fifth Circuit. Shortly after his
appointment, the Eleventh Circuit was created.
Since we rely on characteristics at the time of
selection for the MDL Panel, Pointer is counted
in the numbers for the Fifth Circuit in Figure 1.
Judge Gibbons was elevated to the Sixth Circuit
(from the Western District of Tennessee) while
she was a Panel member. While she sat on two
courts during her Panel tenure, her presence
in the Sixth Circuit is only counted once in
Figure 1.
21. Williams & George, supra note 3.
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of tenure as a judge, and the nature
of a judge's caseload. As we explain
below, the judicial experience of
judges of the MDL Panel varies in sig-
nificant ways from that of the judges
of the Judicial Conference and of
the full Article III judiciary. We find
that district judges make up an even
larger percentage of the MDL Panel
than we would predict based on their
representation in Conference Com-
mittees and the Article III courts as
a whole."z MDL Panel judges have
served on the bench much longer
before appointment than Confer-
ence Committee judges. Finally, we
find that MDL Panel judges are more
likely to have MDL litigation experi-
ence, with much of that experience
gained after appointment to the
Panel.
Both the MDL Panel and the Judi-
cial Conference Committees are dom-
inated by district judges, consistent
with the relative composition of the
Article III judiciary. Between 1968
and 2012, district judges accounted
for 82 percent of the entire Article III
judiciary and outnumbered circuit
judges by more than five to one.23 Of
the 46 members of the MDL Panel, 85
percent were sitting district judges
at the time of appointment (39),
while 15 percent were appellate
judges (7). Circuit judges were better
represented on Conference Commit-
tees than their total numbers would
predict, but district judges still out-
numbered circuit judges by a margin
of three to one.24 Thus, district judges
have been slightly overrepresented
on the MDL Panel and underrepre-
22. These figures are based on the court of
service at the time of appointment to the MDL
Panel or Conference Committee.
23. Between 1968 and 2012, 1,977 judges
served on district courts, 371 judges served on
circuit courts, 15 judges served on the Supreme
Court, and 54 judges served on specialized
Article III courts.
24. Of the 861 judges appointed to Confer-
ence Committees between 1971 and 2012, 635
were sitting district judges (73.8%), 219 were
circuit judges (25.4%), and seven were special-
ized court judges (0.8%).
25. Because these times are estimated from
the first court on which the judge served during
the period, we are overestimating the time of
service slightly. A better comparison is to con-
sider the time in the position in which the judge
served when appointed to the Conference Com-
mittee seat. Again, the range was from zero to
50 years, and the average time of service was
sented on Conference Committees.
Multidistrict litigation is focused
on case management and pretrial
litigation, making federal trial judges
a logical choice for the MDL Panel. If
we look at service prior to appoint-
ment to the MDL Panel, 98 percent of
Panel judges had experience on the
district court. Just one MDL Panel
judge had served only on the court of
appeals. By comparison, 18 percent
of Conference Committee judges had
never served on the district bench.
The difference likely reflects a need
to appoint experienced trial judges
to the Panel.
The chief justice also is more
likely to select judges with longer
tenures on the bench to serve on
the MDL Panel than on the Con-
ference Committees. Committee
judges, on average, served approxi-
mately eight years before appoint-
ment with a range of zero to 50
years. (The most common length of
service [mbde] was four or five years
before appointment to a commit-
tee. 25) Judges on the MDL Panel also
had varying lengths of tenure before
appointment-between five and 31
years of service. But they served on
average almost twice as long as Con-
ference Committee judges (16 versus
8.4 years) before appointment to the
MDL Panel. 26
The disproportionate number
of district judges and more senior
judges appointed to the MDL Panel
may reflect an effort to select judges
who had experience with complex
litigation and, in particular, multidis-
slightly less, at 7.9 years. The modal time to
appointment was four years.
26. In considering the time a judge spends in the
seat where they serve at the time of appointment to
the MDL Panel we see a slightly different pattern.
The average time spent is 15.5 years, again raised
by outliers such as judges Hodges and Murrah,
who served several decades before appointment
to the MDL Panel. The range of service times is
smaller, with one judge, judge Gurfein, serving four
years on the Second Circuit before appointment to
the MDL Panel. Overall, appointment to the MDL
Panel appears to take twice as long as appoint-
ment to the judicial Conference Committees.
27. Three cases were consolidated before mul-
tiple judges and are excluded from this analysis
because they were exceptional cases. Within the
life of an MDL, cases are transferred to other
judges for a variety of reasons. Our focus is on
the judge initially assigned to the MDL at the
time of consolidation.
trict litigation. While not required,
such experience is certainly one
rationale for specialization. The
conventional wisdom is that chief
justices appoint panelists with MDL
experience. Chief Justice Warren,
who recommended the creation of
the Panel and named the original
seven panelists, picked four judges
involved in the electrical equipment
litigation, which gave rise to the MDL
Panel. Three served on the Coordi-
nating Committee: Its chair, Judge
Murrah, became the first Panel chair,
and two members, Judges Becker and
Robson, joined him. A fourth appoin-
tee, Judge Lord, tried several of the
cases. Subsequent chief justices
would be able to name judges who
handled MDL cases created under
the statute. The question is whether
they did so.
The great majority of Article III
judges have never served as an MDL
transferee judge. Between 1968 and
2012, 1,465 multidistrict actions
were consolidated before 779 dif-
ferent judges. 27 Thus, one-third of
Article III judges had been assigned at
least one MDL. A few judges handled
multiple MDLs. At the high end, Dis-
trict Judge Charles Weiner managed
15 MDLs over his long career, which
included time on the MDL Panel. On
average, a judge serving between
1968 and 2012 handled 0.62 MDLs.
That average decreased to 0.58 if the
judge never served on the MDL Panel.
The foregoing figures include all
Article III judges since any Article
III judge can serve as a transferee
judge, but nearly all MDL assign-
ments are made to district judges.
Only two circuit judges have served
as MDL transferee judges. Figure 2
shows MDL experience for all district
judges. On average, a district judge
serving during this period handled
0.75 MDLs. Forty percent of district
judges have been assigned an MDL.
We would expect chief justices to
appoint judges with prior MDL expe-
rience to the MDL Panel. But judges
appointed to the MDL Panel are
only slightly more likely to have had
prior MDL experience than judges
not appointed. Of the 46 MDL Panel
judges, only 25 had MDL experi-
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ence when appointed; that is, 52
percent of MDL appointees had prior
MDL experience as compared to 40
percent of all judges. If we focus only
on district judges, who are more
likely to have MDL experience, dis-
trict judges appointed to the MDL
Panel averaged 0.94 MDLs while all
district judges averaged 0.75.
MDL Panel members frequently
gain MDL experience after joining
the Panel. If we look at their entire
service including time on the Panel,
MDL panel judges average 2.5
MDLs. This higher average reflects
the experience of eight members,
including three original panelists,
who were not assigned any MDLs.
Seven of those eight judges served as
circuit judges, and one of the seven
had no district court experience
and thus was unlikely to be an MDL
transferee judge. Figure 3 shows the
variation in MDL experience among
all Panel members (both district and
circuit judges). Figure 4 shows the
assignments for district judges only.
The average number of assignments
to district judges on the MDL Panel
is 2.8.
Chief Justice Roberts appears to
have placed more importance on
prior MDL experience than his pre-
decessors. Warren, of course, had no
opportunity to appoint a judge with
prior MDL experience, as the Panel
was created during his tenure. Not
surprisingly, as MDL experience has
grown within the judiciary over time,
so has the average experience for
the chief justices' appointees to the
Panel (though not linearly). Burger's
appointees averaged 0.81 MDLs prior
to appointment, while Rehnquist's
appointees averaged 0.67 MDLs and
Roberts's averaged 1.7. With the
small number of appointees for any
chief justice, the averages are highly
subject to the influence of outliers.
Chief Justice Roberts, for example,
appointed Judge Breyer, who had
more prior MDL experience than any
other Panel member in history (11
MDLs). (Judge Weiner gained some of
his experience after being appointed
to the Panel.)
Most judges, even most district
judges, do not have experience as
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MDL transferee judges. Panel judges
clearly gain that experience, but
many join the Panel without any
experience managing an MDL. The
emphasis placed on the complex liti-
gation experience of Panel members,
while still important to the MDL
process, may be overstated. Given
that the amount of MDL experience
has changed for Panel members over
time, it is likely that other character-
istics have changed as well. We now
turn to an examination of other char-
acteristics of Panel members relative
to the rest of the judiciary and the
Judicial Conference.
Appointing President
Article III judges are appointed by
the president with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Given the fre-
quency of divided government, it is
































3 (17%) 264 (40%) 453 (43%)
15 (83%) 388(60%) 588(57%)
22 (48%)
24 (52%)
not surprising that we find the judi-
ciary almost evenly split during the
1968 to 2012 period: 1,172 judges
(48.5%) were initially appointed by
Democratic presidents, and 1,245
(51.5%) by Republican presidents.





between judges appointed by Demo-
crats and those appointed by Repub-
licans: 22 (47.8%) were appointed
by Democrats while 24 (52.2%)
were appointed by Republicans. The
Judicial Conference Committees,
however, have been less balanced:
340 (39.5%) were initially appointed
by Democrats as opposed to 521
(60.5%) by Republicans. (These
numbers include every appointment
made by a chief justice even if the
judge has prior service.)
As reflected in Table 3, our analy-
sis of the data suggests that neither
the appointments to the MDL Panel
nor to the Judicial Conference Com-
mittees have been evenly balanced
by partisanship. (Judges who have
served on more than one committee
are recorded only once in Table 3.) Of
course, they are constrained by the
composition of the Article III courts,
which is set forth in the last column.
Chief Justice Warren's appoint-
ments to the Panel, like the Article
III courts at the time, were over-
whelmingly Democratic presidential
appointees. On the other hand, Chief
Justices Burger and Roberts both
named Democratic appointees to
the MDL Panel at a rate higher than
their numbers on the bench (and also
at higher rates than their appoint-
ments to committees). Chief Justice
Rehnquist was much more likely to
name Republican appointees, and
his appointments produce the parti-
san balance we observe in the Panel
as a whole.
Gender and Race
Most federal judges have been
white men. Franklin Roosevelt
appointed the first woman to an
Article III court in 1934, and only
six had served by 1968, when the
Panel was created. But the growth
since that time has been dramatic:
342 women, i.e., 14.1 percent of all
judges, have served on Article III
courts (through 2012). Women have
made up a relatively larger portion
of Conference Committee appoin-
tees: 152 out of 861 (17.7%). The
MDL Panel, however, has had few
women members: only four of the 46
Panel judges (or 8.7%). Recent MDL
appointments suggest that female
representation is trending up: Four
out of the 18 appointments since
2000, when the first woman was
named, have been women (22.2%).
As has already been demonstrated,
the importance of experience on the
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bench is likely part of the reason for
the low numbers of women on the
JPML. Female judges really grew
in number during the Carter years,
but with an average of 16 years of
service for any judge before joining
the JPML, it was not until 1996 that
a sufficient number of women had
the average level of experience to
join the JPML. The first appointment
of a woman in 2000 is close to this
timeframe.
The federal judiciary has also
become an increasingly racially
diverse institution since 1968.
Nearly 13 percent of judges self-
identified as a member of a racial or
ethnic minority. A similar percent-
age (12%) of Judicial Conference
Committee judges self-identified as a
minority. But every MDL Panel judge
has self-identified as white.
The gender and racial break-
down of each group is easier to see
in Table 4 (for women) and Figure
5 (for racial minorities). To avoid
over-counting, the numbers reflect
initial appointment. Thus, if a judge
were elevated, she is only reported
for her first court. Justice Soto-
mayor, for example, is recorded as
a Latina appointed to the district
court but not counted in numbers
based on her subsequent service
on both the appellate court and the
Supreme Court. Specialized courts
are Article III courts to which the
judge is appointed, such as the U.S.
Court of International Trade (and
its predecessor, the U.S. Customs
Court).
The variation by chief justice in
appointing women and minorities to
the JPML or the Judicial Conference
is also interesting. Table 5 shows
the variation by chief justice, along
with the important comparisons of
the Article III courts as a whole.28
We would expect to see a change
in the racial composition of the MDL
Panel for several reasons. First, the
Article III judiciary has diversified
dramatically, as reflected in Table 5.
Furthermore, the current chief jus-
tice's rate of appointment of minori-
ties to the Judicial Conference
Committees is high. Finally, minor-
ity judges are gaining experience
Women on Article III Courts (Based on Initial Appointment)








Note: Percentages r flect the proportion f women appointed to that level of court who also served on the MDL Panel or on a Judicial Conference
Committee. The last column reports the percentage of all members of that type of court who are women. A judge who served on more than one type
of court is reported based only on the judge's initial appointment during our period of study or, if already on the bench, the seat held in 1968.
The JPML Judicial Conference Members Article III Judges
White N African American N Hispanic/Latino/a H Other
Note: Calculations are based only on judges who reported a race. Percentages reflect the proportion f minorities appointed to that level of
court who also served on the MDL Panel or on a Judicial Conference Committee. The "Other" category includes judges who self-identify as Asian
American, American I dian, or more than one race. The last column reports the percentage of all members of that type of court who are minorities.
A judge who served on more than one type of court is reported based only on the judge's initial appointment during our period of study or, if
already on the bench, the seat held in 1968.
in multidistrict litigation. The MDL
Panel has assigned consolidated
MDL cases to 96 different minority
judges, but most of these assign-
ments occurred since 1990. By the
end of 2012, one-third of minority
judges had managed an MDL. Cur-
rently there are 60 minority district
judges who have served as an MDL
transferee judge. The increased
experience with multidistrict liti-
gation and with experience in the
federal courts generally makes the
appointment of a minority judge to
the JPML increasingly likely.
28. We group race into white and non-white
for purposes of this table to make the com-
parison easier. The total number of Conference
Committee appointments by race does not total
to 861 because of missing information on some
judges.
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Male 16(89%) 542 (83%) 908 (88%)
Female 2(11%) 110 (17%) 133 (12%)
White 18(100%) 581 (90%) 908 (88%)
Non-white 0 67 (10%) 127 (12%)
Conclusion
The JPML was created to provide a
forum where decisions about coor-
dination of complex issues could
be decided. This Panel, initially
comprised of members with above-
average experience with complex lit-
igation, continues to serve as an area
of expertise in complex litigation
today. Judges who serve on the Panel
have more experience with complex
litigation than the rest of the Article
III judges. The majority of this expe-
rience, however, comes with service
on the Panel. While on average Panel
members serve as transferee judges
for more cases than the rest of the
judiciary, they are still more likely
than not to join the Panel without
MDL experience. So while complex
litigation experience is clearly rel-
evant to Panel appointment for
the chief justice choosing Panel
members, it is not the whole story.
Comparing Panel members with
other appointments by the chief
justices (and the rest of the Article
III courts) shows some interesting
comparisons. Panel members, while
not evenly drawn from the circuits
themselves, are evenly drawn from
the groups of judges appointed by
each party. The lack of partisan divi-
sion among Panel members is even
more surprising when compared
with the members of the Judicial
Conference Committees and the rest
of the judiciary from which the chief
justice makes appointments.
With partisanship mattering less
than the rest of the literature on judi-
cial appointments would suggest,
one might think that other character-
istics of judges are also balanced, but
this is not the case. Some differences
in membership among appointments
to the Panel, the Conference Com-
mittees, and the Article III courts
are easier to explain than others. For
example, the preference for district
WWW.AJS.ORG * JUDICATURE 205
judges, or those with district-judge
experience, to serve on the Panel is
not surprising. The Panel oversees
the coordination of the litigation at
the trial level, and trial-court expe-
rience would be invaluable to the
consolidation decision. Likewise,
longer tenure on the bench would
likely serve the judge well, giving her
more experience to understand the
problems of complex litigation and
the potential benefits of coordina-
tion. Of course, longer tenure also
serves judges on the Judicial Confer-
ence Committees well, as a greater
understanding of the administrative
structure of the courts and its needs
is more likely to come over time. It
is perhaps this need for substan-
tial experience that explains lower
levels of participation by women
and minorities on the JPML than we
find in the judicial Conference Com-
mittees or the federal judiciary as a
whole.
Given the importance of the chief
justice in making appointments to
the JPML, it is important for future
research to consider his influence
in greater depth than explored here.
Scholars and commentators recently
have been interested in the extent
to which the chief justice serves his
own policy goals through the power
of appointment. It is possible that
appointments to the JPML serve
similar goals. In demonstrating
the strong variation among judges
serving on the JPML, this article pro-
vides a strong foundation for such
future endeavors. *
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